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Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of 
Ownership from Control 
Jill E. Fisch† 
The Modern Corporation & Private Property1 is a paradigm-
shifting analysis of the modern corporation.  The book is perhaps best 
known for the insights of Berle and Means about the separation of own-
ership from control and the consequences of that separation for the allo-
cation of power within the corporation.2  The Berle and Means story fo-
cuses on the shareholder as the owner of the corporation.3  Berle and 
Means saw the mechanism of centralized management—in which the 
shareholder retains the economic interest but not the control rights asso-
ciated with ownership—as threatening the conception of shareholder in-
terests in terms of property rights.4  In particular, they viewed the share-
holder’s role as evolving from that of a traditional owner to that of a 
“supplier of capital, a risk-taker pure and simple.”5 
Financial innovation has enhanced this evolution.  As Professor 
Tamar Frankel explains, new financial instruments enable investors to 
decouple the “bundle of rights” historically represented by a financial 
asset, such as a share of stock, into multiple components in which risk, 
economic interest, and control rights need not be proportional to each 
                                                 
† Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Prepared for the sympo-
sium, In Berle’s Footsteps, at the Seattle University School of Law.  These thoughts are inspired by 
Tamar Frankel’s paper prepared for this symposium: The New Financial Assets: Separating Owner-
ship from Control, 33 SEATTLE L. REV. 931 (2010).  I am grateful for helpful comments and probing 
questions raised at the Symposium and for research assistance provided by Vijit Chahar, University 
of Pennsylvania Law School, LL.M. Class of 2010. 
 1. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World 1968) (1932). 
 2. See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 737 (2001) (describing the book’s historical context as well as its significance for contem-
porary corporate theory). 
 3. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 294 (“From earliest times . . . the stockholder in the 
corporation has posed both as the owner of the corporation and the owner of its assets.”). 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 297 (“Must we not, therefore, recognize that we are not longer dealing with 
property in the old sense?”). 
 5. Id. at 297. 
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other.6  Frankel expresses a dual concern about the consequences of slic-
ing and dicing corporate ownership interests.  First, she worries about the 
complexity of the resulting financial instruments and the extent to which 
their attributes and risks are disclosed to investors.7  Second, Frankel is 
concerned about the lack of transparency associated with financial engi-
neering.8  In particular, she fears that decoupling may create incentives 
for some market participants to exercise control rights in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the interests of other shareholders and the corporate 
enterprise and that, most problematically, these actions can be underta-
ken in secret.9 
Frankel joins a well-respected group of scholars in identifying how 
derivatives and other instruments have increased conflicts of interest 
among shareholders.10  Such conflicts pose a challenge for the Berle and 
Means conception in that managing the corporation “for the benefit of its 
owners, the stockholders”11 becomes a more complex task if those own-
ers have different financial interests.  In effect, decoupling creates two 
sets of Berle and Means agents: traditional corporate managers and those 
who exercise the control rights of owners without holding a proportio-
nate economic interest.  Modern financial products may create economic 
incentives that cause their holders, like managers, to act in ways that 
pose a danger to the corporate enterprise.  Writing in the shadow of the 
financial crisis of 2008, Frankel is particularly concerned about excessive 
risk-taking. 
Decoupling is not limited to exotic financial products like deriva-
tives and reverse exchange securities, however.  A majority of publicly-
traded equity securities in the United States are held through intermedia-
ries.  These intermediaries—mutual funds, pension funds, insurance 
companies, foundations, and so forth—introduce the same separation of 
ownership from control.  The structure of the intermediaries, in which 
agents control investment and voting decisions on behalf of the benefi-
cial owners who have contributed the investment capital, is analogous to 
that of the corporation.  As with the corporation, those who exercise con-
trol have different interests and incentives from those they represent.  In 
                                                 
 6. Tamar Frankel, The New Financial Assets: Separating Ownership from Control, 33 
SEATTLE L. REV. 931 (2010). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hid-
den (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) (describing how investors can use de-
rivatives to engage in empty voting). 
 11. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 293. 
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short, the modern institutional investor itself functions much like the 
Berle and Means corporation. 
When these institutions in turn act as shareholders, they introduce a 
second layer of agency costs into corporate decision-making, and the 
decoupling identified by Frankel becomes the rule rather than the excep-
tion.  Institutions may lack the incentives of traditional, rational share-
holders and may act in ways that are inconsistent with the maximization 
of shareholder value.  This agency problem is of particular concern in 
light of recent market and regulatory efforts to increase management’s 
accountability through shareholder empowerment.  In particular, the fea-
sibility of improving corporate decision-making through shareholder 
empowerment depends critically on the actions and incentives of those 
empowered shareholders. 
This essay explains how the intermediation of the U.S. capital mar-
kets exacerbates the traditional separation of ownership and control—as 
identified by Berle and Means—by adding a second layer of agency is-
sues.  The essay then considers the implications of this decoupling for 
recent efforts to increase shareholder control over management.  The es-
say concludes by challenging the hypothetical shareholder construct.  
Intermediation raises the troubling question of whether the future of cor-
porate law can rely on shareholders to safeguard the corporation—from 
managers or each other. 
I.  THE INTERMEDIATION OF THE U.S. EQUITY MARKETS 
It has been nearly a century since Berle and Means published the 
first edition of The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  In those 
years, the ownership of the capital markets has shifted dramatically.  Al-
though the early data is limited, institutions owned less than 10% of the 
stock of publicly traded U.S. companies from the 1920s through the 
1950s.12  By 2009, institutional investors owned 50% of total U.S. equi-
ties,13 and retail investors (the household sector) held only 38%.14  Insti-
                                                 
 12. See, e.g., JAMES HAWLEY & ANDREW WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 48 
tbl. 3.1 (Univ. Penn. Press 2000) (providing details on share ownership in 1922, 1952, 1956, and 
1959); see also Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255, 1275 (2008) (stating that institutions owned 8% of outstanding shares in 1950). 
 13. Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States (2010), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/z1.pdf (including institutional inves-
tors such as banks, savings institutions, insurance companies, private pension funds, government 
retirement funds, mutual funds, closed-end funds, ETFs, and brokers and dealers in Flow of Funds 
data). 
 14. Id. 
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tutions own a higher percentage of the largest corporations; at the end of 
2007, institutions owned 76.4% of the largest 1,000 corporations.15 
A substantial proportion of institutional ownership takes the form 
of intermediated investment in the sense that the institutional investor 
acts as an intermediary, pooling the direct and indirect contributions of 
investors and controlling the investment of that money.  Institutional in-
termediaries—which include mutual funds, hedge funds, and pension 
funds, among others—exercise virtually complete control over their port-
folio investments.  In addition to making investment decisions, institu-
tions exercise voting power with respect to the securities that they hold.  
They also determine whether to lend securities held in their portfolio, 
whether to leverage their investment through borrowing, and whether to 
hedge their positions with derivatives. 
By investing their money through an intermediary, investors dele-
gate to that intermediary complete authority over investment decisions 
subject only to the specified terms of the investment vehicle.  Investors 
neither have the power to approve, choose, or veto specific investment 
decisions, nor do they have the power to initiate a change in interme-
diary’s investment strategy.  However, in some cases, investors may 
have the right to vote upon a change in policy proposed by the institu-
tion.16  Investors also lack the authority to determine how the interme-
diary will vote the shares that it holds in portfolio companies.17 
As a result, investors in an institutional intermediary lack control 
rights over the portfolio companies in which the intermediary invests.  
They also have limited control over the intermediary itself.  Investors 
often have the power to elect some or all of the intermediaries’ directors 
                                                 
 15. Press Release, The Conference Bd., U.S. Institutional Investors Boost Ownership of U.S. 
Corporations to New Highs (Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://www.conference-
board.org/utilities/pressdetail.cfm?press_id=3466 (citing The Conference Board, The 2008 Institu-
tional Investment Report: Trends in Institutional Investor Assets and Equity Ownership of U.S. 
Corporations Report No. 1433-08-RR).  The Report defines institutional investors as “pension funds, 
investment companies, insurance companies, banks and foundations.” 
 16. See, e.g., Jill Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries __ U. PA. L. 
REV. __ (forthcoming 2010) (describing right of mutual fund investors to approve a change in in-
vestment objectives). 
 17. Some commentators have raised the prospect of pass-through voting for investors in 
pension funds and mutual funds.  See, e.g., Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corpo-
rate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 47–52 (1991) (discussing pass-
through voting and other alternatives to allow pension fund beneficiaries to determine fund voting 
policies); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate 
for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 843, 888–89 (2009) (advocating optional pass-
through voting to allow mutual fund shareholders to overcome the passivity of their intermediaries).  
ESOP plans, which do not represent the type of pooled investments described in this essay, are re-
quired to provide pass-through voting to their participants.  See 26 U.S.C.S. § 409(e)(2). 
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or trustees,18 but such voting rights are generally even less effective than 
the voting rights of shareholders in publicly held corporations.19  Inter-
mediaries, such as mutual funds and pension funds, are not subject to the 
accountability imposed by the market for corporate control.  Indeed, 
some intermediaries are not even subject to capital market discipline in 
the form of exit20—most public pension funds, for example, require pub-
lic employees to contribute a designated percentage of their salaries to 
the plan.21  The separation of ownership and control within the interme-
diary is analogous to that identified by Berle and Means.22  With respect 
to the underlying portfolio companies then, intermediation creates two 
levels of separation. 
The intermediary’s separation of ownership from control creates a 
second layer of agency costs.23  The intermediaries’ interests are often 
different from those of other shareholders and may not involve the exclu-
sive goal of maximizing firm value.  Passive investors, like indexed mu-
tual funds, may prefer to minimize cost in an effort to match the returns 
of their benchmark rather than to engage in more costly activism.  Busi-
ness interests, such as the opportunity to manage an issuer’s retirement 
plan, may cause an investment advisor to vote inappropriately to support 
management.24  Some hedge funds may seek to benefit from momentum 
trading and volatility, and may adopt strategies through leverage and de-
                                                 
 18. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (providing for mutual fund investors to elect fund board of 
directors); CalPERS, Structure and Responsibilities, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about 
/organization/board/structure-responsibilities.xml (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (explaining that six of 
13 CalPERS board members are elected by current and retired CalPERS members (beneficiaries)). 
 19. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 16 (describing limited utility of mutual fund shareholder voting 
power). 
 20. Investors impose discipline on poorly performing investments through the capital markets 
by selling those investments. 
 21. See, e.g., Steven K. Paulson, Colo. Lawmakers Approve State Pension Rescue Plan, 
DENVER POST (Jan. 26, 2010), available at http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_14274153 
(describing legislation mandating increased employee contributions to Colorado state pension sys-
tem). 
 22. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the agency costs within institutional interme-
diaries are greater than those within public corporations.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus 
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1283 n.21 
(1991). 
 23. See also Jill Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 U. VA. L. REV. 785, 
819–20 (2009) (describing how lack of transparency and regulatory constraints have limited the 
market’s ability to discipline intermediary decisions, increasing agency costs). 
 24. See, e.g., Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-
2106, 79 SEC Docket 1673 (Jan. 31, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm 
(“An adviser may have a number of conflicts that can affect how it votes proxies. For example, an 
adviser (or its affiliate) may manage a pension plan, administer employee benefit plans, or provide 
brokerage, underwriting, insurance, or banking services to a company whose management is solicit-
ing proxies. Failure to vote in favor of management may harm the adviser’s relationship with the 
company.”). 
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rivatives that offer the potential for spectacular returns but that are “in-
consistent with any concept of a shareholder as an owner of a corpora-
tion.”25  A number of public pension funds have been criticized for fo-
cusing on social investing at the possible expense of maximizing prof-
its.26  Similar concerns have been raised with respect to university en-
dowments, which face pressure from members of the university commu-
nity to engage in socially responsible investing when such investing may 
sacrifice returns.27  Sovereign wealth funds have been described as pur-
suing “objectives that go beyond the purely economic, including the 
promotion of environmentally friendly strategies, industrial development, 
or the support of national champions.”28 
In addition to institution-specific objectives, the growth of inter-
mediation increases investor appetite for risk.  Most institutional inves-
tors are highly diversified, enabling them to reduce or eliminate the ef-
fect of firm-specific risk on their overall returns.  Diversification, how-
ever, decouples economic interest from ownership in the same way as 
complex financial products.  Indeed, the objectives of the diversified in-
stitutional shareholder do not provide meaningful limitations on mana-
gerial risk-taking and may cause managers to take excessive risk in an 
effort to boost share price.29 
An additional layer of agency costs occurs within the intermediary.  
Those who make decisions on behalf of the intermediary, such as portfo-
lio managers and investment advisers, may act out of self-interest rather 
than in the interests of the intermediary.  Mutual fund portfolio manag-
                                                 
 25. Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market Volatil-
ity—What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 909, 927 (2005). 
 26. See Mary Williams Walsh, Calpers Wears a Party, or Union, Label, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2002 (describing these criticisms).  See also Steven Malanga, A Grandstanding Politician Investi-
gates Wall Street, REAL CLEAR MARKETS, Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/ 
2009/09/23/a_grandstanding_politician_investigates_wall_street_97422.html (describing loss after 
CalPERS sold tobacco stock). 
 27. Teresa H. Clarke, et al., University Endowment Summit: Critical Issues in Endowment 
Management 18–20 (2005), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/global-markets-
institute/past-research-and-conferences/past-research/more/university-endowment-summit-pdf.pdf. 
 28. Shams Butt, et al., Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Growing Global Force in Corporate 
Finance, 19 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 73, 75 (2007).  As Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers noted: 
The logic of the capitalist system depends on shareholders causing companies to act so as 
to maximise the value of their shares. It is far from obvious that this will over time be the 
only motivation of governments as shareholders. They may want to see their national 
companies compete effectively, or to extract technology or to achieve influence. 
Posting of Lawrence Summers to Economists’ Forum, Sovereign Funds Shake the Logic of Capital-
ism, http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2007/07/sovereign-funds.html (Jul. 30, 2007, 9:04 EST). 
 29. See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, Maximizing the Wealth of Fictional Shareholders: Which 
Fiction Should Directors Embrace?, 32 IOWA J. CORP. L. 381, 395–97 (2007) (exploring manage-
ment risk-assessment in the context of fully diversified shareholders). 
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ers, for example, like corporate managers, have an incentive to maximize 
their personal profit.  As many commentators have observed, portfolio 
managers are typically evaluated and compensated on a short-term basis, 
usually quarterly.30  This may lead to both investment and governance 
actions that sacrifice long-term value in favor of maximizing the portfo-
lio’s current net asset value.31 
Other motivations may cause the objectives of intermediary agents 
to differ from those of the shareholders of the companies in which they 
invest.  The investment decisions of public pension funds, for example, 
may be influenced by the political aspirations of public officials.  Offi-
cials of both New York and California’s public pension funds have been 
accused of directing fund investments on the basis of political connec-
tions and kickbacks.32  California Treasurer, Phil Angelides, was criti-
cized for accepting campaign contributions from companies with ties to 
CalPERS and CalSTERS, on whose boards he sat.33  CalPERS’s activism 
at Safeway was criticized as resulting from President Sean Harrigan’s 
personal pro-union sympathies.34 
The foregoing few examples demonstrate the extent to which the 
interests of institutional intermediaries may not reflect the interests of 
shareholder-owners in maximizing firm value, as contemplated by Berle 
and Means.  As with modern financial instruments, the decoupling ef-
fected by intermediation offers the potential to alter corporate decision-
making.  The extent to which this decoupling affects corporate opera-
tions depends on the extent to which intermediaries can exercise gover-
nance power.  As a result, intermediation has substantial consequences 
                                                 
 30. See, e.g., Posting of Simon Wong to Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance 
and Financial Regulation, Tackling the Root Causes of Shareholder Passivity and Short-Termism 
(Jan. 31, 2010, 9:41 EST), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/01/31/tackling-the-root-
causes-of-shareholder-passivity-and-short-termism/#more-6483 (“Presently, many owners evaluate 
their fund managers’ performance quarterly.”). 
 31. See, e.g., id. (“It is unsurprising, therefore, that asset managers focus on delivering short-
term returns, including through pressuring investee companies to maximize near-term profits.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Craig Karmin, Rattner Involved in Inquiry on Fees, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 17, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123992516941227309.html (describing 
allegations of kickbacks by New York public pension plans); Martin Z. Braun & Gillian Wee, How 
Pension Placement Agent Exploited Political Ties, BLOOMBERG, May 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601127&sid=atwTqj6OjY7U (stating that 
“[i]ndictments and civil complaints filed by regulators so far depict public officials allowing such 
connections and financial self-interest to trump merit when deciding who will be entrusted to invest 
taxpayer money”). 
 33. Malanga, supra note 26 (describing these criticisms). 
 34. Sonja Steptoe, CalPERS: Corporate Reformer Under Fire, TIME, Dec. 17, 2004, available 
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1009728,00.html (describing conflict-of-
interest charges leveled against activism at Safeway). 
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for the debate over shareholder empowerment, the topic to which this 
article now turns. 
II.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERMEDIATION 
The existence of additional agency costs within the intermediary 
structure offers reason to question the proposition that institutional inves-
tors can improve corporate decision-making by more active participation 
in corporate governance.  A number of commentators have argued that 
institutional ownership offers a mechanism to reduce the agency costs 
associated with the separation of ownership and control.35  Activist insti-
tutions, it is said, can counteract dispersion and provide a concentrated 
source of governance power rivaling that of management.36  Berle him-
self advocated intermediation as a solution to the separation of ownership 
and control.37 
The hope of reducing agency costs through institutional activism 
has led to regulatory and structural changes to increase shareholder pow-
er.38  For example, in the last several years, many large U.S. companies 
have shifted from plurality to majority voting.39  Unlike plurality voting, 
                                                 
 35. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 830–49 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing 
the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991). 
 36. See, e.g., Sharon Hannes, Corporate Stagnation: Discussion and Reform Proposal, 30 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 51, 74 n.103 (2004) (“Many corporate observers believe that the growth in institu-
tional ownership signals the end of Berle and Means’ prophesized separation of ownership and con-
trol.”) (referring to Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate Law: 
Who’s in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177 (1993)). 
 37.  Berle stated: 
Suppose . . . trust companies were in the habit of accepting, on “custodian account,” de-
posits of stocks from small shareholders, thereby gathering many small holdings into an 
institution commanding a block so large that protection was worthwhile, and that they al-
so provided themselves with power to represent the depositors of stock. Such institutions 
could easily keep themselves informed as to the affairs of the corporation . . . and, as 
representing their clients, could take the action necessary to prevent or rectify violations 
of property rights . . . . 
Bratton, supra note 2, at 752 (quoting Adolf A. Berle, Jr., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE (William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1928)).  Berle later retreated from this position, recogniz-
ing that the intermediaries, if they remained passive, would exacerbate the separation of ownership 
and control and, if they instead exercised power, would substitute institutional managers for corpo-
rate managers without solving the separation of ownership and control.  William Bratton & Michael 
Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 
IOWA J. CORP. L. 99, 143 (2008) (describing Berle’s refinement of his position in 1954). 
 38. See generally Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Influence of Proxy Advi-
sors, __ EMORY L.J. __ (forthcoming 2010) (describing increases to shareholder voting power and 
importance). 
 39. In 2005, more than 90% of the S&P 500 companies employed plurality voting.  See, e.g., 
Brooke Masters, Shareholders Flex Muscles: Proxy Measures Pushing Corporate Accountability 
Gain Support, WASH. POST, June 17, 2006, at D01 (stating that, as of 2005, fewer than 30 of S&P 
500 companies had majority voting or director resignation policies in place).  By 2008, over 80% 
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majority voting enables shareholders to defeat a director candidate nomi-
nated by management even without nominating a competing candidate, 
thereby increasing the significance of shareholder voting in uncontested 
elections.  The effectiveness of majority voting is enhanced by a recent 
change to a New York Stock Exchange rule that eliminates discretionary 
broker voting in uncontested director elections.40  As the New York Law 
Journal explained, the effect of the rule is a “massive shift of voting 
power from brokers to institutions . . . .”41 
The scope of shareholder voting power has also increased.  “Say on 
pay,” an annual advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation, is 
part of many of the bills proposed in response to the 2008 financial cri-
sis.42  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 200843 required 
companies that received TARP funding to provide say-on-pay, and sev-
eral companies have voluntarily implemented say on pay provisions.44  
Shareholders may also receive the power to nominate their own director 
candidates and to compel management to include those nominees in the 
company’s proxy statement.  In 2009, the Delaware legislature passed 
legislation explicitly authorizing proxy access bylaws.45  The SEC has 
also reintroduced a proxy access proposal,46 and although efforts to se-
cure the adoption of a rule authorizing proxy access have been unsuc-
                                                                                                             
used majority voting.  Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, (NYU Law and Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 08-43, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1281516&rec=1&srcabs=1293926. 
 40. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend NYSE Rule 452 and Correspond-
ing Listed Company Manual Section 402.08, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60215 (Jul. 1, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf. 
 41. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, A Seismic Shift in Mechanics of Electing Directors?, 
N.Y.L.J., Jul. 27, 2006, at 5 (describing effect of then-proposed NYSE rule change). 
 42. See, e.g., Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S. 1181, 110th Cong. § 2 
(2007); Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 2002, available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/Key_Issues/Financial_Regulatory_Reform/FinancialRegulatoryRe
form/111_hr_finsrv_4173_full.pdf. 
 43. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
 44. See, e.g., Editorial, Stockholders Should Demand a Say on Executive Pay, SEATTLE TIMES, 
May 14, 2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/20092211 
58_editb15sayonpay.html (noting that resolutions had been approved by fifteen companies this year 
and that Hewlett-Packard and Occidental Petroleum had agreed to adopt say-on-pay without a share-
holder vote); SmartPros, Say-on-Pay is on the Way, March 2, 2009, http://accounting.smartpros.com/ 
x65641.xml (listing Occidental Petroleum, Intel, Hewlett-Packard, MBIA, Motorola and Ingersoll-
Rand as companies that have adopted say-on-pay). 
 45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009). The legislature also adopted a provision authorizing 
bylaws that provide for reimbursement of a shareholder’s proxy solicitation expenses.  Id. at § 113. 
 46. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 33-9046, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-60089, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-28765, 17 C.F.R. §§ 
200, 232, 240, 249, 274 (Jun. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/33-
9046.pdf. 
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cessful for many years, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro has stated that she is 
“committed to bringing final rules before the commission regarding the 
ability of shareholders to nominate directors.”47 
Some commentators have called for still more shareholder empo-
werment.  Most famously, in a 2004 article, Lucian Bebchuk proposed 
allowing “shareholders to initiate and vote to adopt changes in the com-
pany’s basic corporate governance arrangements.”48  Bebchuk’s analysis 
is responsive to the observations by Berle and Means that practical and 
regulatory developments have weakened shareholder control from its 
roots in property rights.49  Importantly, however, the proposal is pre-
mised on the expectation that institutional investors, who will dominate 
the proposed voting decisions, “will be relatively sophisticated and well-
informed on the corporate governance issues involved.”50 
To be successful in improving corporate performance, shareholder 
empowerment critically depends on the existence of a hypothetical 
shareholder—a shareholder who will exercise governance power know-
ledgably and who will deploy that power to maximize firm value.  Al-
though some commentators have suggested that institutional investors 
are well suited for that role, there are reasons to question this conclusion.  
First, as some scholars have noted, institutions may simply lack the ca-
pacity to exercise greater governance power effectively.51  Shareholder 
empowerment may, in that case, simply increase the power of third party 
advisors, such as RiskMetrics, that have no economic interest in the un-
derlying portfolio companies.52  Second, even where institutions exercise 
governance power effectively, their chosen ends may not be consistent 
with the hypothetical shareholder construct, or with the best interests of 
the corporation they seek to control. 
III.  CONCLUSION—OBJECTIFYING THE CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 
In their last chapter, Berle and Means quote Walther Bathenau’s de-
scription of the depersonalization of ownership of the public corporation 
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 50. Id. at 891. 
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tional activism has had little or no effect on the performance of targeted firms).  See also Jill Fisch, 
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and the resulting objectification of the corporate enterprise.53  Although 
they recognize that the future of the corporation may involve a shift away 
from fidelity to the interests of shareholders, Berle and Means resist the 
shift, in part because shareholder interests tether the exercise of the cor-
poration’s economic power. 
The analysis in this essay suggests that this reliance on shareholder 
interest as a constraint on corporate decision-making may be misguided.  
Berle and Means offer a reminder that the original justification for share-
holder control rights was based on the traditional conception of the 
shareholder as the owner of a property right.  The economic interest of 
the property owner supplied the shareholder with the incentive to exer-
cise control in a manner that maximized firm value.  It is unclear whether 
minority shareholders ever exercised control in this way—at least in the 
public corporation—but intermediation has exploded the myth of those 
hypothetical shareholders.  Institutional intermediaries and their deci-
sion-makers hold a variety of complex economic interests that challenge 
their incentive to maximize firm value.  At the same time, their ability to 
reduce firm-specific risk through diversification, coupled with the rela-
tive insensitivity of many institutions to overall levels of market risk, 
may produce operational decisions that impose excessive costs upon so-
ciety.54 
The problem remains: if dispersed public shareholders, financial 
innovation, and intermediation combine to reduce the aspects of control 
associated with ownership, is there a substitute that can adequately con-
tain management power?  The answer to that question depends, in part, 
on the specification of the corporation’s objectives. 
Here, Berle equivocated.  In the last chapter of The Modern Corpo-
ration, Berle and Means identified a potential vision of the corporation 
that rejects the private property conception in favor of broader social ob-
jectives.  The authors stated that the weaknesses of both shareholder and 
manager control “have placed the community in a position to demand 
that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but 
all society.”55  This vision is consistent with Berle’s “New Individualism 
Speech” in which he argued that managers should exercise their control 
power in trust, but in trust for the public interest, not the private property 
                                                 
 53. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 309. 
 54. See, e.g., William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empower-
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interests of shareholders.56  It is, however, inconsistent with most of the 
preceding discussion in The Modern Corporation.57 
As Bill Bratton and Michael Wachter explain in detail, in his later 
years, Berle moderated the defense of shareholder primacy that animates 
much of The Modern Corporation58 in favor of an approach that Bratton 
and Wachter term “corporatism.”59  Although corporatism lost out in 
1932, recent events offer reason to be wary of claims that shareholder 
empowerment is the solution to the growth of managerial power identi-
fied in The Modern Corporation.  In the end, Berle’s writing, hinted at in 
Chapter Six and developed in his subsequent work, provides the seeds 
for justifying reforms that limit both management and shareholder power 
in favor of increased regulatory oversight of the public corporation. 
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